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Abstract. Some recent theories of emotion propose that emotions are 
perceptions of value laden situations and thus provide us with epistemic access 
to values. In this paper I  take up Mark Wynn’s application of this theory to 
religious experience and try to argue that his McDowell-inspired account of 
intentional emotions leads to limitations for the justificatory force of religious 
experiences and to difficult questions about the metaphysical status of the 
object of religious experiences: if emotions and religious experiences are largely 
similar, then, just as emotions, religious experiences cannot justify beliefs about 
the existence of objects, but merely beliefs about certain qualities they might 
have. Also, if emotions and religious experiences are largely similar, then, just 
as the objects of emotions, the object of religious experience turns out to be 
essentially mind-dependent.
For a  long time emotions seemed to have a  rather bad reputation, at 
least where the acquisition of knowledge was concerned. It seemed to 
be a  truth universally acknowledged that if you wanted to understand 
a  certain subject matter properly, you should look at it when you are 
calm and level headed, and not when you are under the influence of 
an emotional disturbance. In the last thirty or forty years this negative 
picture of emotions has changed to an extent. Whilst it seems still true 
that, when you want to acquire knowledge in the natural sciences, for 
example, you are more likely to succeed when you are calm and collected 
than when you are in the middle of an anger episode, emotions are no 
longer thought to be without any epistemic merit at all. On the contrary, 
when you want to acquire knowledge about whether a  certain act is 
cruel or kind, whether a certain person is amiable or abominable, and 
whether a certain piece of art is beautiful or repulsive, emotions are not 
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only helpful but indispensible. How can that be? One thought is to say 
that emotions are like perceptions. Just as perceptions represent objects 
as having certain primary or secondary qualities, emotions represent 
objects as having certain evaluative properties. And just as perceptions 
that represent objects as having a  certain quality justify beliefs about 
objects as having certain qualities, emotions that represent objects as 
having certain evaluative qualities justify beliefs about objects as having 
certain evaluative qualities, too.
Mark Wynn has recently taken this theory of emotions and applied 
it to religious experiences. If I  understand him correctly, his idea is 
that religious experiences can be understood as being on a  par with 
emotions. Just as emotions are not mere blind sensations, but intentional 
mental states that tell us something about the world around us, religious 
experiences are not blind sensations of a mysterious character, but rather 
intentional mental states that tell us something about God. In this paper 
I want to try to retrace Wynn’s thoughts and examine if, and if yes, how, 
an application of current positions in the philosophy of emotions to the 
phenomena of religious experiences can indeed be fruitful.
I. WYNN’S IDEA
In this section I want to present Wynn’s position as developed in the first 
chapter of his book Religious Experience and Religious Understanding 
(2005). I  should say right away that Wynn’s claims are much more 
modest than the positions I will go on to look into and criticise. At the 
very outset Wynn writes that
I am not trying to provide a comprehensive treatment of the epistemic 
significance of theistic experience, but just to consider how certain 
standard objections to such experience may be seen in a new light given 
a reconceived account of the nature of emotions. (2005: 3)
In the following I will look at Wynn’s description and refutation of said 
objections, before I will leave Wynn’s footsteps to see in the next couple 
of sections what such a new treatment of the epistemic significance of 
theistic experience may look like and which problems it might encounter.
Perhaps, before discussing objections to theistic experiences and 
how they may be presented in a new light, one should ask what such 
experiences actually look like. This is a  difficult question, as we are 
talking here about an  experience that not all of us have had and that 
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we thus cannot take to be generally familiar. I  take it that what Wynn 
has in mind is an emotional encounter with God, an ‘affectively toned’ 
experience of God’s presence (e.g., Wynn 2005: 5, 28). One of the few 
examples of religious experiences that Wynn gives is a  description of 
John Henry Newman’s account of an experience of God in hearing the 
voice of one’s conscience (Wynn 2005: 18). Interestingly, Wynn claims 
along with Newman that in hearing the voice of conscience, we have 
an  experience of God, not of something else that is pointing to God, 
even though this experience is mediated. How are we to understand 
this? I think the idea may be this: in experiencing a pang of guilt, say, we 
experience God directly, even though God’s presence is mediated by the 
pang of guilt. Thus, even though our experience of God’s presence, or his 
voice, is clothed within emotions, it is by the mediation of these emotions 
that God himself can be felt. The natural next question is why one should 
believe that some emotions are indeed mediators of God’s presence, 
rather than just mere subjective sensations that come and go without 
mediating anything. This, in fact, is the objection that Wynn mentions 
in the quote at the beginning of this section. Even though it may be true 
that when we are in religious environments like churches, or when we 
pray, or when we think about what God’s reaction to our actions may be, 
we experience a whole range of emotions, it is not clear why we should 
think that these emotions have a mediating function. They may as well 
be blind sensations, mere feelings that overcome us, just as spontaneous 
chills and aches. I will call this the blindness objection.
It is at this point that Wynn turns to recent discussions in the 
philosophy of emotions, or, more precisely, the philosophy of values. 
Within the philosophy of values we also find a version of the blindness 
objection. Value experiences, one might think, are not genuine 
experiences of something that exists in the world, but mere blind 
emotional sensations. When I experience a certain action as cruel, then 
my mixture of disgust and anger is not an experience of a genuine value 
property of cruelty that the act somehow possesses, but rather a blind 
sensation, which I in turn project onto the value-free reality in which the 
act takes place. This position, which takes it that what happens in value 
experience is not the recognition of some real value property, but the 
projection of a sensation onto a value-free reality, is called Projectivism. 
Put negatively, Projectivism is a version of the blindness objection: value 
experiences are not intentional mental states that can correctly represent 
the world as being a certain way, but mere sensations that we project onto 
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a value-free world. Wynn’s strategy to counter the blindness objection 
against religious experience is to look for a refutation of the blindness 
objection against value experience, which he finds in the work of John 
McDowell. The following is a summary of McDowell’s argument against 
Projectivism as reconstructed by Wynn (2005: 3-6):
(1) Projectivism presumes that all value experiences can be 
disentangled into value-free external elicitors and purely 
subjective affective sensations.
(2) Such a disentanglement is not always possible.
(3) Hence, Projectivism is false.
The first premise looks uncontroversial, at least if we add that the 
disentanglement must be possible in principle, even if it is difficult 
in fact. The second premise requires an  explanation. Why is it that 
value experiences cannot always, at least in principle, be disentangled 
into value-free elicitors and subjective experiences? One argument 
that McDowell puts forward and that Wynn discusses is that if such 
a disentanglement was always possible, then it would also be possible for 
someone who does not share our value experiences at all, who perhaps 
lacks emotional dispositions altogether, to master the use of our value 
concepts and apply them competently. This would be odd. If we imagine 
a  Mr. Spock type character, that is a  creature without any affectivity 
at all, to come and live amongst us, master our evaluative language 
and call an  instance of wanton violence against an  animal cruel, then 
even though his application of the concept ‘cruel’ would be right in 
a respect, we probably still would not credit him with having a proper 
understanding of what ‘cruel’ means. If he does not, and cannot, feel 
angry, disgusted, and pity when he sees an animal being beaten, then he 
cannot really see the cruelty of the act. Even if he knew the whole range 
of non-evaluative properties to which we reacted with this mixture of 
anger, disgust and pity, and he knew that we reacted that way and in turn 
projected our reactions onto the non-evaluative properties in question, 
we would still not credit him with an understanding of the meaning of 
cruelty. If this intuition is along the right lines, then we must conclude 
that our emotions are not mere blind reactions that we project back onto 
a value-free world, but that they are states that enable us to see something 
that is there, something that a  person without emotions cannot see. 
Otherwise Mr. Spock, knowing all there is to know about the extensions 
of value experiences and the workings of human affectivity, but without 
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experiencing emotions himself, should have a proper understanding of 
values. He does not, hence Projectivism is wrong.
The intuition pushed here is similar to the one Peter Goldie means 
to trigger with his thought experiment of ice-cold Irene. In an analogy 
to Frank Jackson’s Mary, the colour scientist in a black and white world, 
Goldie wants us to imagine icy-cool ice scientist Irene, a woman who 
knows all there is to know about ice, who also knows that people often 
have fear reactions towards icy surfaces, but who has never felt fear 
herself in her life. One day, she slips on an icy pond and suddenly begins 
to fear ice herself. As Goldie puts it,
Before, she knew that the ice was dangerous, for she knew that it merited 
fear, but, because she now is able to think in a new way of fear, she now 
understands in a new way what it is for the ice to be dangerous. (Goldie 
2002: 245)
Similarly, we may imagine Mr. Spock as suddenly feeling anger, disgust 
and pity when seeing a dog being mistreated. Now, we want to say, he 
knows more than he did before. He suddenly is able to grasp what it 
means that the act is cruel, the value of cruelty is properly presented to 
him – something that was not the case from the perspective of all his 
theoretical knowledge before.
Is the intuition that is pushed by McDowell’s thought experiment of 
a non-emotional user of value concepts and Goldie’s icy-cool Irene one 
that is strong enough to support premise two in the argument against 
Projectivism? In order to assess this, I  think it is useful to introduce 
yet another analogy. There are certain emotional experiences and 
associated values that we can talk about competently, without ever 
having had the experience ourselves. Think of a person whose partner 
has been diagnosed with a terminal illness. We can try to imagine the 
horrible prospect of losing someone dear to us, how hard it must be to 
try to make his or her remaining time as cheerful as possible without 
letting ourselves be overcome by sadness and grief, but we will not 
really know the true meaning of such an  event unless we are in this 
situation ourselves. Nevertheless, we use the concepts referring to such 
unexperienced horrors accurately. Undoubtedly we learn something and 
possibly begin using these concepts properly when we face the described 
situation ourselves. The question, however, is, whether this really means 
that a disentanglement between experience and elicitor is impossible, or 
whether it means something else. I think it means something else.
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When you suddenly enter a  situation that, up until then, you just 
observed from the third person perspective, then you learn what it is 
like to have a particular experience – be this the experience of seeing 
something red, feeling fear, or the horror of a prospective loss. Within 
a  Projectivist picture, you are suddenly the one doing the projecting, 
rather than just the one observing others projecting whatever it is that 
they are experiencing. Your experience does not reveal something that 
you could not see before. But you know now that which is being projected. 
Before, you could point to the usual elicitors and the characteristic 
behaviours, observable from the third person perspective, that would 
make up a particular value. You could say, this is a situation in which 
someone knows that someone who is close to him will die soon, he is 
very shaken by this, this must be a most horrible situation – but you did 
not know what it meant. Now that you are in this situation, in which 
the observable characteristics are much the same, you know what it 
means – because you are the one who is shaken and who projects all his 
sadness onto the situation at hand. The brute intuition that the person 
who has a particular value experience knows more than the person who 
is just able to apply the value concept accurately without ever having 
had the relevant value experience is thus easily accommodated by the 
Projectivist.
McDowell’s argument is, however, not so easily refuted. The thought 
behind premise two is not merely that, were a complete disentanglement 
possible, then people like Mr. Spock would be potential competent users 
of value concepts, but that, were a complete disentanglement possible, 
then we should expect more or less clearly defined groups of non-
evaluative properties that make up the appropriate elicitors of particular 
value experience. For example, we should expect a  clearly defined 
group of natural properties, such as causing a creature harm in order to 
produce pleasure in the bystanders and taking pleasure in watching such 
acts, as the appropriate elicitors of emotional reactions which, projected 
onto such acts and dispositions, make up the concept ‘cruel’. If it was not 
possible to produce such a clearly defined group of natural properties as 
the appropriate elicitors of an emotional reaction, then the application 
of a  value concept would become random. I  could call anything that 
causes me to have a  particular emotional reaction cruel and would 
not, could not, ever be wrong. And such a complete subjectivism and 
relativism simply does not accurately describe our practise of using value 
concepts. We do argue about whether things are cruel, whether they are 
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kind or whether they are funny rather than accepting just any odd value 
ascription as making sense.
How does this relate to McDowell’s argument? The main thought 
behind premise two, it seems, is that a  disentanglement of a  value 
experience into value-free elicitors and subjective responses is impossible 
because there is not always a clearly defined group of value-free elicitors 
for each value experience. The example McDowell relies on is that of 
funniness. A lot of things seem to be rightly called funny, even though 
they do not seem to have a relevant class of non-evaluative properties 
in common. If we do not assume that they share the property of ‘being 
funny’, then our concept application would be random and unlike 
ordinary concept application. Thus, we should take it that that which the 
concept ‘funny’ refers to is the property of being funny, rather than just 
any odd natural property that happens to make us laugh.
Is this a more plausible support for premise two? One worry is that 
it might be too dependent on the example of funniness. If we take 
concepts like ‘cruel’ and ‘kind’, then the elicitor groups appear much 
less diverse. ‘Cruel’, it could be said, refers to the natural properties of 
causing a creature harm for no good reason; and ‘kind’, it could be said, 
refers to the natural properties of helping, soothing and supporting 
others without expecting anything in return. In other words, perhaps 
disentanglement is possible for a large number of value experiences, and 
where it is not possible, as in the case of finding something funny, the 
value concept does indeed not refer to anything in particular, but consists 
in a mere subjective reaction to whatever it happens to be that causes 
it. Another worry is that, even though it might be impossible to find 
a clearly defined group of non-evaluative properties that appropriately 
elicit value responses, this does not mean that such value responses 
cannot be inappropriate. The Projectivist, I take it, can claim that what 
makes a value response appropriate is whether or not it is appropriately 
embedded in, or consistent with, our other value responses. I can thus be 
criticised for applying the concept ‘funny’ to a joke that is mainly about 
racist behaviour. If I  object strongly to racist behaviour, then treating 
an instance of it as harmless would be inappropriate.
I do not want to pursue arguments against McDowell’s and Wynn’s 
attacks against Projectivism any further, but rather at this point conclude 
the following: based on his portrayal of McDowell’s arguments against 
Projectivism in chapter one of Emotional Experience and Religious 
Understanding, Wynn wants to claim that religious emotional experiences 
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do not have to be conceived of as blind sensations, but can be viewed as 
intentional mental states that reveal something about the world to us. 
I  hope to have shed some doubt over McDowell’s arguments against 
Projectivism, but I  do not think that they are the main worry about 
Wynn’s attempt to use McDowell’s arguments in order to show how 
religious experiences can be experiences of God. In the following I want 
to try to show that, even if we assume that McDowell is right with his 
criticism of Projectivism, his view of what values and value experiences 
are seems, when applied to religious experiences, more damaging than 
constructive.
II. MCDOWELL’S THEORY OF VALUE
Wynn wants to make plausible the idea that religious emotional 
experiences are possibly experiences of God. All he shows, however, 
is that Projectivism as a  rival account of value experiences, that is as 
blind sensations, is not very good. I tried to show in the last section that 
perhaps Projectivism is not as bad a theory as McDowell and Wynn make 
it look, but let us leave that aside. What does a  more positive picture 
look like? If not in a Projectivist way, how exactly are we to understand 
value experiences? I want to draw a brief sketch of how McDowell does 
understand them and then show why this understanding might not be as 
conducive to Wynn’s goal as he seems to think it is.
McDowell (1998) develops his theory of values in response to J.L. 
Mackie’s (1977) arguments against the objectivity of values. His main aim 
is to show that Mackie works with a wrong notion of objectivity. With 
a right understanding of objectivity, so McDowell argues, values can be 
thought of as objective after all. It is his development of the right sort of 
objectivity, and here mainly his claim that values should be understood 
as on a par with secondary, and not primary, qualities, that has led to the 
picture of emotions as intentional mental states that have the function 
to provide access to the evaluative, which Wynn wants to make use of. 
I think, therefore, that a good understanding of McDowell’s value theory 
should be the starting point for assessing Wynn’s thought that religious 
emotions may be an epistemic access to God.
McDowell agrees with Mackie that we do not think of values as being 
there in the world in the same way as we think of atoms and molecules 
as being there in the world, or as we think of densities, shapes and sizes 
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as being there in the world – that is, as existing independently from the 
way we think and feel about them. Mackie argues that if values did exist 
in the world mind-independently, they would be ‘utterly different from 
everything else in the universe’ (Mackie 1977: 38), for they would at 
the same time be there, whether or not humans are or ever have been 
around, and demanding a  particular type of action from us, as soon 
as we happen to perceive them. It is this combination of independent 
existence and intrinsic demandingness that Mackie finds odd. McDowell 
finds it odd, too, but criticizes Mackie for having set the standards of 
objectivity for values unfairly high. This odd combination would only 
be required if values were supposed to be objective in the same way as 
primary qualities are. But values are not supposed to be objective in this 
way, but rather, or so McDowell argues, in the same way as secondary 
qualities are. In contrast to primary qualities, secondary qualities are not 
mind-independent. We do not think of them as playing an explanatory 
role in a scientific picture of the world, a picture that makes no reference 
to how we think and feel about the world. Instead, we acknowledge that 
qualities such as being of a  certain colour, having a  particular smell, 
tasting, sounding or feeling a certain way are all mind-dependent. Take 
the quality of being sour as an example. To be sour an object does not 
only need to have a certain chemical make-up, it also needs to taste sour. 
Even though an object could be sour and not ever be tasted by anyone, it 
is still true that what makes it sour is that it would taste sour to someone 
like us under suitable circumstances.
How does an analogy to secondary qualities help to save the objec-
tivity of values? After all, as we have just seen, secondary qualities are 
essentially mind-dependent, that is, essentially consist of dispositions 
to cause certain mental states. Does this not play into Mackie’s hands 
and show that values are subjective? It does not, and the reason is that 
secondary qualities are not simply projected by us onto the world in 
a way that every projection is permissible. Secondary quality ascriptions 
can be true or false, which means that secondary qualities must be more 
than mere figments of the brain: in order to have a false secondary quality 
ascription, it must be possible for a perception of a secondary quality to 
be inaccurate. Some perceptions thus are mere figments of the brain, 
whereas others get something right. McDowell puts his point this way:
two notions that we must insist on keeping separate: first, the possible 
veridicality of experience (the objectivity of its object, in the second 
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of the two senses I  distinguished), in respect of which primary and 
secondary qualities are on all fours; and, second, the not essentially 
phenomenal character of some properties that experiences represent 
objects as having (their objectivity in the first sense), which marks off 
the primary perceptible qualities from the secondary ones. (McDowell 
1998: 139)
The two senses of objectivity that McDowell distinguishes here are 
these: experiences, such as perceptions, are experiences of objects. If 
these experiences are such that they are either accurate or mistaken, 
that is, if experiences are assessable in these terms, then the object of the 
experience cannot be wholly determined by the experience itself. This is 
the second sense of objective that McDowell talks about. Both primary 
and secondary qualities are objective in this sense, because experiences of 
both of them are assessable in terms of truth and falsehood, or accuracy 
and inaccuracy. The first sense of objectivity McDowell talks about refers 
to the way in which we have to think of qualities: primary qualities we 
think of as not essentially phenomenal, which means as not having as 
a necessary ingredient a property that is in some way mind-dependent. 
When we experience an object as having a certain shape, then in order 
to think of the object as having this shape, we do not need to think of 
how the object appears to us. The opposite is true, however, of secondary 
qualities. When we experience an object as having a certain colour, then 
in order to think of the object as having this colour, we must think of 
how the object appears to us – namely as looking red, blue, yellow or 
whatever the colour in question is. To sum up: both secondary and 
primary qualities are objective in the sense that experiences of them can 
be accurate or inaccurate, whereas primary qualities are also objective 
in the sense that they are not essentially phenomenal, and secondary 
qualities are subjective in the sense that they are essentially phenomenal.
Values, McDowell goes on to argue, are analogous to secondary 
qualities. They also are objective in that experiences of them can 
be accurate or inaccurate, and they are also subjective in that they 
are essentially phenomenal. Take the property of being admirable 
as an  example. When we admire something, our admiration can be 
accurate or it can be mistaken, depending on whether the object is 
question really is admirable or not. In this sense, the evaluative property 
of being admirable is objective. Whether an object really is admirable 
or not is determined by whether or not it is, or would be, admired by 
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suitable people under suitable circumstances. In this sense the property 
of being admirable is subjective – it is essentially phenomenal in that it 
has a disposition to cause a certain mental state, that is, admiration, as 
an essential ingredient.
In order to reconnect all this with Wynn’s idea that certain emotional 
religious experiences may be experiences of God, let us see what it means 
for the nature of emotions. McDowell himself does not seem to be too 
interested in this question, but on the back of his theory of values other 
philosophers have developed a  picture of emotions as analogous to 
perceptions of secondary qualities (e.g. Deonna 2006, Döring 2007). It 
is easy to see why McDowell’s theory of values lends itself nicely to such 
a theory of emotions. McDowell gives us a way in which to understand 
the concept and metaphysics of values by referring to the concept 
and metaphysics of secondary qualities. If we want to understand the 
epistemology of values, it seems natural to look at the epistemology of 
secondary qualities and see if we can find useful comparisons. There we 
see that perceptions of secondary qualities, such as seeing a red apple, 
hearing a loud bang, smelling a flowery perfume, or tasting a sweet cake, 
are our epistemic access to them. In other words, not only do perceptions 
of secondary qualities play a crucial role in the metaphysical make up 
of secondary qualities, they are also the way in which we get to know 
about them. For an apple to be red is for it to look red under suitable 
circumstances to a suitable observer, and knowing that an apple is red 
takes our perceiving it to be red. The same thing may now be said about 
values: not only do emotions about evaluative properties play a crucial 
role in the metaphysical make-up of evaluative properties, but knowing 
that an act is admirable takes our admiration for the act.
We have come then from telling a metaphysical story about values to 
telling an epistemological story about values; a story that involves that 
emotions serve as epistemic access to a mind-dependent world of values.
III. A PROBLEM FOR WYNN’S IDEA
The thought that Wynn wants to make plausible is that religious emotions 
are not, at least not in all cases, blind sensations, but intentional mental 
states that can serve as epistemic vehicles. He wants to do this by showing 
that ordinary emotions are epistemic vehicles to ordinary values, which 
he does by referring to McDowell’s work. In the first section I introduced 
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McDowell’s arguments against Projectivism, which are the ones that 
Wynn actually uses. They end, however, in a negative picture: we might, 
if we accept them, believe that emotions are not blind sensations, but we 
are in the dark as to what they actually are. In order to provide a positive 
picture, I introduced in section two McDowell’s value theory, which lends 
itself to a perceptual theory of emotions. I take it, but cannot be certain, 
that this is something close to what Wynn has in mind for a  positive 
picture of emotions.
In this section I want to show that, if a perceptual theory of emotions 
on the back of McDowell’s value theory is what Wynn has in mind, then 
he runs into difficulties. In order to do this, I will first try to spell out 
the analogy between ordinary emotions and religious emotions on this 
picture, and then show that it is far from clear how we are to understand 
the intentional object of a religious emotion.
Ordinary emotions, on the perceptual theory, are intentional mental 
states that ascribe evaluative properties to objects. Fear, for example, 
is about a  dangerous animal; anger is about an  offensive remark; and 
gratitude is about a helpful or kind act. The intentional content has two 
main ingredients: a particular object, which is the object in the world at 
which the emotion is directed (e.g. the animal, the remark, or the act) 
and a  formal object, which is the evaluative property that is ascribed 
to the particular object (e.g. the property of being dangerous, offensive 
or helpful). Perceptual theories of emotions take it that emotions begin 
with a non-emotional cognitive state, such as a perception of an object, 
or a belief about a state of affairs. I see a  tiger, for example, or believe 
that this remark was intended to hurt me, or believe that this act was 
performed with the intention to get me where I  want to get. This so 
called cognitive base of an emotion (see e.g. Deonna and Teroni 2012: 
5) is then followed by the actual emotion: we ascribe to the particular 
object given in the cognitive base an evaluative property. The evaluative 
property, or formal object of an  emotion, also serves as a  standard of 
appropriateness for emotions. Fear is only appropriate if the object in 
question is really dangerous; anger is only appropriate if the remark in 
question is really offensive; and gratitude is only appropriate if the action 
in question is really helpful.
With this theory of ordinary emotions in place, we can ask with 
Wynn what religious emotions may look like. Religious gratitude 
and consolation are presumably experiences of God as helping us in 
difficult situations. Religious fear is presumably an experience of God as 
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potentially punishing our wrong-doings. Religious hope is presumably 
an  experience of God as potentially giving us a  good life after death. 
What is striking is that in all these emotional experiences, God figures 
as the particular object of an  emotion. This is a  problem for Wynn, 
because particular objects are not given to us by the emotion itself, but 
by the cognitive bases of emotions – perceptions, beliefs, imaginations, 
hallucinations, illusions and so on. If this is correct, and I  indeed do 
not know of any emotion theory that has it that the particular object is 
given by the emotion, then this means that knowledge of God cannot 
be attained via emotions, but must be attained by some other cognitive 
means. Put differently: perceptual theories of emotions take it that 
emotions are means to gaining knowledge about values, but not means 
to gaining knowledge about the existence of the objects who possess 
these values.
Even though standard perceptual theories do not hold that emotions 
are means to gaining knowledge about the existence of particular objects, 
could one not perhaps stretch the theory so as to make room for this? 
Take the example of your waking up in the middle of the night in a state 
of terrifying fear. At first you don’t know what it is that you are so afraid 
of, but then you get up and begin to search your house for intruders. You 
eventually find out that there indeed had been someone in the house, but 
that he has already left, having taken various valuables with him. Could 
we in this case not say that your fear was a means to gain knowledge about 
an object that was threatening you? Could we not say that it was a hint 
that set you on the trail of the burglar? Wynn might have something 
like this in mind with his example of John Henry Newman’s description 
of an experience of a bad conscience, which I described in section one. 
Wynn’s interpretation of this example is that, when we experience such 
a pang of guilt, we experience God directly, although mediated through 
this pang of guilt. It is not clear how exactly God is meant to enter into 
this experience, as the particular objects of guilt are our own actions, and 
the formal object is the evaluative property of wrongness: when I  feel 
guilty about having lied to someone, I feel guilty about my wrong action. 
So where does God come in? Perhaps Wynn takes it that what we actually 
experience, namely guilt about a  wrong-doing of ours, has a  flipside: 
deference to someone. Even though God might not immediately enter 
into the content of our emotional experience, it is him at whom our 
deference is directed.
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Given that instances of emotional experiences in which the particular 
object is at first unknown, that is, emotional experiences that do not 
seem to be preceded by a cognitive base, do occur, are we not justified 
in concluding that emotions can be ways of getting to know about the 
existence of objects? I do not think so.Take the burglar example again: 
you could say that it was your fear that made you aware of the burglar, 
but the more plausible explanation of the example would be that you 
unconsciously perceived a  noise that triggered your fear response. 
Your means of knowing that there’s a burglar in your house is not your 
sudden fear, but your unconsciously experienced perception of a noise, 
confirmed by a search of the house that made it clear that someone had 
been in and taken things away. Perhaps it would still be correct to say 
that it was your fear that in some way hinted to you that something was 
wrong, but if there were no means independent of emotions to find out 
whether or not a supposed object of an emotion exists, then we would 
not rely on our emotion as evidence for the existence of that object. 
Instead, we would say that we were afraid, but that our fear turned out to 
be inappropriate, because no dangerous object could be made out.
Or could perhaps another reference to the analogy between 
perceptions of secondary qualities and emotions as perceptions of 
evaluative properties give fresh support to the idea that emotions can 
be evidence for the existence of primary objects? After all, perceptions 
of the secondary qualities of objects have the power to convince us that 
the object that possesses them really exists. When we think that there 
might be a cat in the house, and then smell a cat smell and hear a miaow 
somewhere, then these perceptions of secondary qualities add to the 
evidence that the cat really exists. Might not a  sudden fear of cats do 
the same? I do not think that many of us would answer this question 
affirmatively. If someone says ‘I  knew that the cat was there because 
I  smelt it’, this does make sense. The speaker’s belief seems indeed 
prima facie justified by his olfactory perception. But if someone says 
‘I knew that the cat was there because I was suddenly afraid of it’, then 
we would question the speaker’s justification. Why is that? Possibly the 
main difference between the two cases has to do with the function of 
the mental states in question. Perceptions of all kinds have the function 
to inform us of what is there, whereas emotions of all kinds do not have 
that function. Instead, it is their function, or so the perceptual theorist 
generally has it, to inform us of the evaluative properties of objects (see 
e.g. Prinz 2004: 66). So when we are experiencing an emotion, we are 
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not in the business of finding out what there is, but whether that which 
is there is in some way good for us or not. Thus, when we fear God, or 
feel deference or gratitude towards him, then we do not thereby become 
convinced that he exists. If these feelings hit you out of the blue, and you 
are someone who does not already believe in God’s existence, then you 
will not by having these emotions become convinced that God exists. 
Either you must acknowledge that you have believed in God’s existence 
all along, without having been aware of it, or you must conclude that 
your emotions are inappropriate. But to begin to believe that God exists 
on the basis of sudden fear of him would be unjustified.
Let us assume, then, that emotions provide in the first place 
information about evaluative properties, but not about the existence of 
the objects to whom the properties belong. What this means for Wynn 
is that the idea that emotions provide us with knowledge about the 
existence of God seems hard to maintain. At least if religious emotions 
worked in a way that is similar to ordinary emotions, then a perception 
of or a  belief about God should serve as the cognitive base to which 
emotions like gratitude or fear are reactions. It would then, however, 
be this perception or this belief that served as the main provider of 
knowledge about God’s existence, rather than the reactive emotion. Does 
this mean that Wynn’s idea should be given up? Not necessarily. Wynn 
sometimes expresses himself in a way that lends itself to an interpretation 
of religious emotions that is not on a  par with ordinary emotions 
as conceived of by perceptual theorists. Consider the following two 
quotes: ‘perhaps theistic experience can be understood (in some cases 
anyway) as a kind of affectively toned sensitivity to values that “make 
up” Gods reality?’ (Wynn 2005: 5) and ‘we should think of the source 
of religious experience as a set of value-indexed qualities, and not some 
set of properties which can be adequately characterized in quantitative 
(or in general, in non-normative) terms’ (Wynn 2005: 21). Wynn seems 
to endorse the fact here that if emotions get us in touch with anything, 
then it will be with values. Nevertheless, he seems to deny that in order 
to ascribe values, we must have a cognitive base that provides us with 
the object to whom the values are ascribed. Instead, he seems to think it 
possible that the object can be thought of as ‘made up of values’, as a ‘set 
of value-indexed qualities’. What could this mean?
First of all we should note that, if Wynn is right, then religious 
emotions seem to be different from ordinary emotions. Ordinary 
emotions ascribe value properties to objects previously given in 
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a cognitive base, whereas religious emotions in some way sense values, 
which are in turn not ascribed as properties to some object, but which 
make up an object. To put the same point differently: ordinary emotions 
are reactions to objects that we believe exist, or that we see, imagine, or 
hallucinate. The properties that emotions ascribe to the objects are not 
properties that are essential to the object. A tiger is still a tiger, even if it is 
not dangerous. Ordinary emotions thus do not inform us about essential 
properties, but non-essential aspects of objects that might be important 
to us. In contrast to this, religious emotions would, on this new reading, 
not be reactions to believed, perceived, imagined or hallucinated 
objects, but rather first encounters with God’s essential properties. God 
would, on this reading, be an entity composed of various values such as 
helpfulness, awe-inspiringness, kindness, and so on. If we read ‘make up’ 
as necessary, even though possibly not sufficient, conditions for God’s 
existence, then God would be these values. A weaker reading, such as 
for a  example a  reading that sees God as a being that possesses these 
properties, but that sees them as neither sufficient nor necessary for 
God’s existence, might be more plausible, but would have to give up the 
idea that emotions are an epistemic access to God’s existence. For if the 
evaluative properties are not essential, then all we have encountered is 
a set of evaluative properties, and we are back to the dealing with cases 
of emotions without particular objects. As I tried to show earlier, such 
emotions are generally seen as inappropriate, rather than as epistemic 
hints to hitherto unknown objects.
Does it make sense to say that the evaluative properties we encounter 
in religious emotions are essential properties of God? I  think it might 
make sense, but I also think that we would have to take consequences 
on board that I am not sure Wynn and like-minded people would like to 
take on board. If we go back to McDowell’s analogy between values and 
secondary qualities, we will see that he describes secondary qualities, 
and hence by analogy also values, as essentially phenomenal, even 
though possibly veridical. What it means for a quality to be essentially 
phenomenal is for it to consist essentially in a  disposition to cause 
certain mental states. Colours are like that, as well as smells, noises, and 
sounds. It makes sense to say that values are like that too. For something 
to be admirable, it has to be such as to evoke admiration in the right 
circumstances, for something to be pitiful, it has to be such as to evoke 
pity in the right circumstances, and for something to be kind, it has to 
be such as to evoke gratitude in the right circumstances. Let’s now go 
169INTENTIONAL EMOTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE ABOUT GOD
one step further with the analogy: for something to be God, it has to be 
such as to evoke awe, fear, gratitude, etc., in the right circumstances. This 
follows directly from saying that God has values as essential properties 
and applying McDowell’s theory of values. But what we are saying here 
is nothing else than that God is essentially mind-dependent, just as 
colours, smells, and the property of being admirable. It takes reference 
to us, or creatures like us, for these properties to come into existence. 
It is not the case that it merely takes sensory apparatuses like ours, or 
emotional sensibilities like ours, to get these properties in view. That is, 
the phenomenality of secondary qualities is not a mere epistemological 
matter, so that we can say that these properties are there independently 
of us, and we can think of them as being there independently of us, but 
it takes certain sensibilities to become aware of them. No, the thesis 
is metaphysical: without reference to these certain sensibilities these 
properties would not be there. And to say this about God’s essential 
properties is to say that in order to give a  full account of the kind of 
being that God is, we need to make reference to these sensibilities. God 
is essentially mind-dependent.
Maybe it is possible to maintain such a  position. If we say that 
response-dependent qualities such as awe-inspiringness, kindness and 
fearsomeness are necessary, but not sufficient essential qualities of God, 
then perhaps we could still believe that God also possesses response-
independent qualities such as being omniscient and omnipotent. Such 
beliefs about God’s response-independent properties, however, could 
not be justified by reference to religious emotions. The bigger problem 
though seems to be this: is it possible to maintain a belief about God as 
the creator of the universe, including creatures like us, if we must think of 
God as a being that, without a reference to sensibilities like ours, would 
not exist? Can he have created our sensibilities, if it takes a reference to 
our sensibilities for him to exist?
To come to a conclusion, let me summarise the following points as the 
main ones I would like to make regarding Wynn’s thought on religious 
emotions as possible epistemic accesses to God: first, Wynn’s reliance on 
McDowell’s arguments against Projectivism is possibly too strong and 
results in a merely negative picture of religious experiences – they are 
not necessary blind experiences, but if they are not blind, what exactly 
are they? I tried to fill in this picture by drawing further on McDowell’s 
work, in particular his analogy between values and secondary qualities. 
The general idea that emerged was that emotions are perception-like 
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states, and that their content can be fruitfully compared to the content of 
perceptions of secondary qualities. I think there are two main problems 
when one tries, as Wynn does, to interpret religious experiences on the 
lines of ordinary emotions as seen by perceptual theorists. One is that 
ordinary emotions do not justify beliefs about the existence of their 
particular objects. Thus, we cannot claim by comparison that religious 
experiences can justify beliefs about the existence of God. Second, if we 
take the evaluative properties that an emotion ascribes to an object as 
essential properties of that object – as Wynn seems to suggest, but as 
perceptual theorists would deny – we end up with a picture of God as, at 
least partly, essentially mind-dependent.
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